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The possible entry of Turkey into the European Union raises more than an
eyebrow. If many objections have a political avour, one of them concerns
an economic aspect: transfers. As a new member state with a GNP per
capita which is 30% lower than the EU-15 average (Lejour and de Mooij
(2005)), Turkey would be a net recipient of EU harmonization funds. Such
a perspective is obviously hard to swallow for many incumbents, not keen to
see their net transfers from Brussels diminished again, only a few years after
the 2004 enlargement.
This paper adopts a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) perspective to
explore whether this objection to the accession of Turkey to the European
Union is well-founded. The idea is that mechanisms may exist such that the
general equilibrium eect of Turkey's entry into the European Union may
compensate, or even outweigh the negative eect of transfers from incumbent
members to Turkey. The aim of this paper is to scrutinize the quantitative
relevance of some of these mechanisms.1
Our analysis stems from the probable improvement of Turkish institu-
tions due to the full adoption of the Copenhagen criteria. Following the
widespread literature (Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Dawson (1998), Klein
and Luu (2003), North (1990)), we accept the hypothesis that better insti-
tutions prompt better economic performance. To model this view in a DGE
framework in the specic case of Turkey, we assume that accession to the
European Union will push Turkish total factor productivity (TFP) up.
In this context, we build a two-country DGE model similar to those pi-
oneered by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994). Turkey and the European
Union are modelled as two countries trading in goods. To mimic the resource
transfer from the European Union to Turkey, we shall assume that the EU
household pays a lump-sum transfer to the Turkish one in the aftermath of
the enlargement.2 Such a transfer is modelled as proportional to the output
1Ertan  Ozg uzer (2007) develops an analytical model that deals with the same issue in
a static set up.
2If accession takes place, Turkey will benet from both the structural and the cohesion
EU funds (see European Commission (2007b) for details about the denitions of the funds
and the eligibility criteria). The EU structural funds are typically granted for specic
objectives or specic projects, in order to help backward regions in the Union. The EU
Treaties' denition of a backward region is a region whose per capita income is less than
75 percent of the EU average. All the Turkish regions qualify for funds according to
this criterion (Griths (2004)). The EU cohesion fund is intended for countries whose
per capita GDP is below 90 percent of the Community average. Again, Turkey qualies
for fund according to this criterion. So, we can conclude that our lump-sum transfer
assumption is an innocuous simplication for the sake of analytical tractability.
3gap between the EU-25 and Turkey, with the proportionality factor estimated
from the data.
We shall rst study the price-eect of a TFP increase in Turkey, assuming
factor immobility. The idea is that a TFP increase in Turkey will cause the
price of Turkish exports to decrease, thereby positively aecting the utility
of Europeans. This eect operates through two channels. First, the price
decrease directly aects consumption, inducing both an income eect (EU
consumers get richer) and a substitution eect (Turkish goods cost relatively
less). Second, hours worked in the European Union change as a consequence
of the shift in production.
By means of numerical simulations, we assess both the direction and
the quantitative importance of these eects. We then compare them with
the welfare eects due to the transfer. In fact, the transfer also inuences
the terms of trade, and entails signicant general equilibrium eects. This
exercise allows us to estimate how big the induced TFP increase must be to
fully compensate the Europeans for the transfer. We then extend the model
to the case of perfect capital mobility, to verify whether mobile capital can
aect the transmission mechanism of the model. It turns out that it does,
and signicantly so.
The results show that, within the assumptions made in this paper, Turkey's
accession to the European Union might be benecial for European citizens,
provided that TFP in Turkey increases enough (31% of the initial gap, in the
model with no capital mobility; 45%, in that with capital mobility).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the two-country model economy. In Section 3, we present the calibration of
the parameters and discuss the results of the simulations. Section 4 discusses
the TFP-convergence hypothesis, in terms of both theory and empirical ev-
idence. Section 5 draws together the threads of the argument and advances
some conclusions.
2 The benchmark model
We model the European Union and Turkey within a two-good, two-country
DGE framework similar to Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994). Each coun-
try produces one good, denoted as Y for the European Union and Y  for


























t ), and subscripts for time; k is capital, l hours worked, and
the scale factor ez is total factor productivity (TFP). Turkish variables are
denoted by *.
We choose one unit of the European good as the numeraire. We shall
therefore denote as pt the price in period t of one unit of Y , expressed in
terms of Y .
Both goods can be consumed in both countries. The representative Euro-
pean household can consume both the European, (cE), and the Turkish (cT)





















with 0 <  < 1. The variables cj and cj, for j = E;T, stand for the goods
produced in country j and consumed by Europeans and Turks, respectively.3
We assume free trade between countries and perfect competition.4
Labour and capital are assumed to be internationally immobile. Popu-
lation growth is set to zero in both countries. We call n the ratio of the
European to the Turkish population (n = N
N), which is therefore assumed
to be constant.
3Assuming a Cobb-Douglas aggregator is tantamount to assuming  = 1 in an Arm-













In this formulation,  stands for the elasticity of substitution between the home and foreign
good. The empirical evidence about its value is controversial. Typical macroeconomic
estimates of  in the United States range from 1 to 2. Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1994) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) set  = 1:5, while Corsetti, Dedola, and
Leduc (2008) choose a lower value of 0.85. We run a sensitivity analysis to verify the
robustness of our results to changes in the assumed form of the Armington aggregators.
For every simulation presented in this paper, two additional models are simulated, one
with  =  = 0:5, and the other with  =  = 1:5. As expected, the higher the
complementarity between the home and foreign goods, the less powerful is the terms-of-
trade transmission mechanism highlighted in this paper. However, the changes in the
results are qualitatively negligible and quantitatively minor.
4A customs union between Turkey and the EU has been in place since Janury 1996.
It involves the abolition of customs duties, the abolition of charges on industrial and
processed agricultural products, the abolition of quotas, as well as a common tari towards
third countries. Turkey also adopted most of the EU commercial and competition policies.
5This model can be solved by adopting a two-step procedure. First, in
each period t, with xed preferences, endowments and technical conditions,
households in each country determine their optimal allocation between dier-
ent kinds of goods, given the total amount of consumption and investment.
This problem is static by its nature. Second, households have to decide how
to allocate their wealth intertemporally, thereby determining their consump-
tion and saving. This is the dynamic part of the model, and it is again
country-specic.
2.1 The static problem
2.1.1 Firms
In each period t, the representative European rm chooses labour and capital
so as to maximize its prots
 = y   wl   rk; (5)
subject to the technical constraint in Equation (1).5 The variable w is the
real wage, whereas r is the interest rate.
The rst order conditions for this problem give the static demand sched-
ules for labour and capital in the European Union, that is








Symmetrically, for Turkey we have:
w



















For any given total amount of aggregate consumption  c, the representative
European household chooses a combination of European and Turkish con-
sumption goods so as to maximize Equation (3) subject to
c
E + pc
T   c: (10)
5Given the static nature of the problem, we omit the time subscript for simplicity.
6The solution to this problem gives the European demand for each variety











The price index pc is dened as the minimum expenditure  c  cE + pcT




(1   )(1 ): (13)
In view of the symmetry of the problem for Turkey, its demand functions


















()(1   )(1 ): (16)
2.2 The dynamics
The innitely-living representative European household chooses its lifetime
consumption and leisure patterns so as to maximize its lifetime expected








t [lnct + 'ln(1   lt)]; (17)
subject to
at+1 = (1   )at + st; (18)
rtat + wtlt   t  p
c
tct + st; (19)
plus a transversality condition.
In Problem (17), we have chosen a log-log utility function. The param-
eter  is the intertemporal discount factor, while ' is the preference for
leisure. The variable a stands for assets, s for savings. Equation (18) is the
law of motion of wealth, with  being its (constant) depreciation rate. In
7this model, we have assumed that all savings are invested in nancial as-
sets. Equation (19) is the budget constraint equating disposable income to
expenditure. In the latter, we have modelled the per-capita transfer from
the EU to Turkey, (), as a lump-sum direct transfer from the European to
the Turkish representative household.

























Equation (20) is the Euler equation governing the intertemporal alloca-
tion of consumption. Equation (21) is the European labour supply, which,
together with Equation (6), clears the labour market.

































To nish the model, we need to specify the equilibrium conditions. For the








t + t = it   st; (24)
where
it = kt+1   (1   )kt; (25)
stands for the European investment in physical capital. Equation (24) is
the standard balance of payment equilibrium which equates trade surplus, or
decit, to the dierence between investment and saving. This condition also
ensures equality between the supply and demand for all goods.
In the benchmark model we assume that capital is not mobile across
countries. Hence, domestic nancial wealth is wholly invested in domestic
capital:






8Accordingly, the right-hand-side of Equation (24) turns out to be zero.
Finally, although households in both countries perceive the amounts  and
 as a lump-sum transfer, we want them to be correlated with the output
gap between the two countries, and therefore endogenously determined by
the model. In the following, we assume










where Equation (29) scales the transfer to take the dierence between the
populations of the European Union and Turkey into account.
As households do not take Equations (28) and (29) into account in solving
the optimization problem, the transfer acts here as an externality.
3 Worthy transfers? The dynamic impact of
a TFP increase in Turkey
Equipped with the benchmark model developed in the previous section, we
can assess quantitatively whether, in a European perspective, enlargement of
the EU to include Turkey is welfare enhancing, and therefore worth the price
of the resource transfer. Specically, in this section we study the theoretical
and quantitative implications of a TFP increase in Turkey for the EU in the
aftermath of the enlargement. The idea is that adherence to the Copenhagen
criteria leads to a generic improvement in the Turkish institutions, which in
turn increases TFP in the model.6
3.1 Calibration and simulation
In order to simulate the model, we rst need to calibrate the structural
parameters. Table 1 illustrates our choices. The `Target' column reports the
reference variable used for the calibration of each parameter.
The unit period is the year.
The capital shares  and  are set equal to one minus the labor-income
shares in the EU-27 and Turkey, respectively, as measured by the European
Commission (European Commission (2007a)) The parameter  indicates the
proportion of the EU produced good in the European consumption bundle.
Given that imports from Turkey amount to 3% of total European imports, we
6Notice that in this article the TFP improvement is exogenous. In particular, it does
not depend on the transfer.
9Parameter Value Target
 0.43 Labour income share in the EU
 0.47 Labour income share in Turkey
 0.988 Share of EU imports from Turkey
 0.14 Share of Turkish imports from the EU
 0.96 Real interest rate in the model in the EU
 0.96 Real interest rate in the model in Turkey
 0.1 Depreciation rate of capital in the RBC literature
' 1.64 Steady-state hours in the model in the EU
' 1.59 Steady-state hours in the model in Turkey
b 0.007 Regression of net transfers on the GDP gap for the EU-25
n 6.4 Population ratio between the EU and Turkey
 1.35 Steady state level of z
Table 1: Calibration of the parameters
take this to mean that 98.8% of total European consumption does not come
from Turkey (Eurostat (2006)). In a similar way, we set  by computing the
proportion of Turkish imports which come from the European Union. This
turns out to be 45% (Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign
Trade (2007)). The preferences for leisure, ' and ', are calibrated so that
both l and l are 1/3 in the pre-accession steady state. The depreciation
rate of capital, , is set to 0.1, a common value in the literature (Kydland
and Prescott (1982)). We gave both  and  the same 0.96 value, which
guarantees a net real interest rate of about 4% in both countries. We have
assumed the same discount factor for both countries.7
We calibrated the parameter b, the sensitivity of the transfer to the output
gap, by regressing the net per-capita transfers received in 2005 by each EU-
25 country on the gap between the average EU-25 GDP per capita and the
7This is a common assumption in the literature (see for instance Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland (1992), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld and Rogo (1995)). While such
an assumption is only a simplication in the model with no capital mobility, it becomes
instead important when capital mobility is allowed. There, the fact that the two countries
have the same discount factor guarantees that the steady state capital level is non zero in
both of them.
10country's GDP per capita.8 Table 2 shows the output from the regression.9
Regressor Coecient S. E. t stat. p-value
GDP gap 0.00794759 0.00249689 3.1830 0.0040
Mean dependent variable 25.49415 S.D. dependent variable 141.2745
Sum of squared residuals 348243.7 S.E. of regression 120.4581
R2 0.296836 Adjusted R2 0.296836
F(1;24) 10.13145 P-value(F) 0.004002
Log-likelihood  154.7457 Akaike criterion 311.4915
Schwarz criterion 312.7103 Hannan{Quinn 311.8295
Table 2: Calibration of b using an OLS regression with the net transfers as
the dependent variable
The parameter n is computed by taking the ratio of the EU-25 popula-
tion to Turkey's population (Eurostat (2007)). Finally, to model the post-
accession Turkish TFP increase, we assume that TFP grows monotonically







t 1) + t (30)
The parameter  governs the curvature of the function, and the steady-state
level of z.
3.2 Comments on results
We simulated how the model reacts to a positive productivity shock in
Turkey. The shock is such that the TFP gap between Turkey and the EU is
reduced by half at the post-enlargement nal steady state. Specically, the
model starts with the steady-state productivity levels z = 0:47 and z = 0.
This means that at the pre-accession steady state, the Turkish TFP is set
equal to 62.5% of the European one, which roughly corresponds to the TFP
8This is admittedly a sharp simplication. The actual allocation of the EU funds among
member States is usually the result of complex political interactions that are obviously
non-mechanical and dicult to quantify. Our formulation aims at capturing the statutory
denition of the various EU funds in terms of distance between the average EU country
and the country receiving the transfer.
9In an exercise not shown here, we run the regression including also the intercept.
Results show that the value of b is not aected, while the constant term turns out to be
insignicant. To check for the robustness of the calibrated value of b, we run the same
regression on the 2004-2008 years. Results do not change appreciably.
11gap between Turkey and France in the data (Eicher, Garcia-Pe~ nalosa, and
Teksoz (2006)).10 According to our catch-up hypothesis, the new steady
state after enlargement is characterised by z = 0:26, which implies that the
Turkish TFP has increased to 81.05% of the European.
Assuming that there are no transfers before accession, b is set to 0 at the
initial steady state. After accession, Turkey starts to receive transfers from
the European Union, according to Equation (28), with b = 0:007. The red
lines in Figures 1,2, 3 and 4 display the results of this simulation.
There are two impulse mechanisms in this model; the transfer from the
European Union to Turkey, and the assumed post-accession TFP increase in
Turkey. Both have an eect on p, the price of the Turkish good in terms of
the European one, although in opposite directions. While the TFP increase
reduces the price of the Turkish good, because it enhances the eciency of
production in Turkey, the unilateral lump-sum transfer causes p to increase.
The increase in p is the standard terms-of-trade eect found in the interna-
tional trade literature (see Devereux and Smith (2007), Djajic, Lahiri, and
Raimondos-Moller (1998) and Galor and Polemarchakis (1987), among oth-
ers), in a model with capital immobility, and no international borrowing or
lending.
At the beginning of the simulation, the impact of the transfer from the EU
to Turkey is the dominant impulse mechanism. It induces a negative income
eect in the EU and thus a fall in the European consumption. On the other
hand, the transfer has a positive impact on the price index, diminishing the
value of the marginal utility of future consumption. The interest rate rises
(see Equation (20)), making saving more attractive. The fall in consumption
leads to a rise in the number of hours worked, and a drop in wages. The
utility of the European household decreases.
As expected, the transfer has the opposite initial impact on the Turkish
variables.
Due to the assumed S-shaped path of the TFP catch-up by Turkey, the
TFP growth gains momentum as time passes, and nally dominates the
transfer eect, leading to a fall in the Turkish price after the rst decade.
Eventually, the terms of trade, p, decrease by more than 30%.
The drop in the relative price of the Turkish good explains the increase in
the demand for the Turkish good both in Turkey and in the EU. While Eu-
ropean and Turkish agents substitute the cheaper Turkish good for the more
expensive European one, the Europeans will also be experiencing a positive
income eect, as now their own good buys more units of the Turkish one.
Eventually, these eects almost cancel out. The European household also ex-
10We use France as representative of the EU average.
12periences a negative income eect due to the transfer payment to the Turkish
household. These three eects together explain why the European demand
for its own consumption good, cE, (`ceu' in the graphs) stays constant after
an initial drop, in spite of its increasing price. Symmetrically, a negative
income eect will aect Turkish households. Such a negative income eect is
counterbalanced by the sudden transfer that the Turkish agents receive from
the European Union, and by the gradual improvement of their own TFP.
On the whole, these contrasting inuences result in a sudden increase of cE
(`ceustar' in the graphs), the demand for the European consumption good
by the representative Turkish household, that reaches the new steady state
immediately, and then stays roughly constant around it.
Aggregate consumption rises in both countries. However the increase in
consumption is much higher in Turkey than in the European Union. As well
as being a consequence of the demand patterns for the EU and the Turkish
good discussed above, such behaviour also depends on the dierent values
assigned to  and  in Equations (3) and (4). As cT represents a small
share of total consumption in the EU, its variations only have a small eect
on c. On the other hand, c is aected by small variations in cE, due to its
relatively high value in the consumption bundle of the Turkish household.
By construction, the qualitative behaviour of the price indices is explained
by the drop in p. The quantitative dierences between the European and
Turkish indices again depend on the dierent values assigned to  and .
A peculiarity of this model with immobile capital is that both labour and
wealth (capital) in Europe adjust immediately to the new steady-state level,
leaving the behaviour of consumption after the initial period to be explained
by variations of the terms of trade. In other words, labour- and capital-
related variables in Europe are inuenced by the transfer, but not by the
TFP increase in Turkey.
However, the TFP increase in Turkey does aect the capital and labor
dynamics there. The reason for such a dierent reaction of labour and capital
in the two countries is that the terms of trade cannot aect the production
side of the European economy, while the TFP increase that causes the vari-
ation in the terms of trade has, by denition, direct eects on production
in Turkey. The rate of return on capital in Turkey, for instance, jumps at
the very beginning of the simulation and increases for about 20 years after
the accession, to nally fall to the new steady state, when the catching-up
process is over. The Turkish wage follows a more complex path, because of
the impact that the productivity shock has on the demand for labour. This
adds up to the traditional intertemporal substitution of labour supply.
After the initial jump, transfers from the EU to Turkey follow an almost
constant pattern. The positive level of the transfer in the nal steady state
13stems from two assumptions: rst, that the two countries are asymmetric;
and, second, that Turkey will not completely catch up with Europe in terms
of productivity.
Figure 4, shows the behaviour of the instantaneous utility function of the
EU household. Utility decreases slightly in the initial post-accession years, to
increase thereafter. Therefore, to assess whether transfers are \worthwhile"
for European households, we need to compare the life-cycle utility after en-
largement with the counterfactual case of no accession. To carry out this
exercise, we chose an horizon of 300 periods, after which the value of the













where  u is the constant steady state level of utility, the one that Europeans
would have enjoyed, had no enlargement occurred (and had no transfer been
paid). We got u > 0, meaning that, conditional on the assumptions we
have made in this exercise, Europeans would be better o, if Turkey were
admitted to the European Union.
As an additional quantitative exercise, we computed the necessary in-
crease in Turkish TFP for the Europeans to be indierent towards the ac-
cession of Turkey to the European Union (i.e. to get u = 0). It turns out
that, within the framework considered here, the Europeans are indierent, if
Turkish TFP rises from 62.5% to 74.1% of European TFP, i.e. if the initial
TFP gap is reduced by 31%.
3.3 Capital mobility
So far we have assumed that capital does not move between the European
Union and Turkey. For all its being a useful simplication, such an assump-
tion is nonetheless at variance with the available evidence. Turkey liberalised
capital ows as early as 1989. In 2003, the New Foreign Capital Law was
introduced, so as to facilitate foreign direct investment (FDI) in the coun-
try. In 2007, Turkey received 2.5% of the total EU-25 FDI, and its market
integration index was 1.9, compared with a value of 3.5 for the EU-2511.
In this section, we relax the immobile capital assumption. That is, house-
holds of both countries now have direct access to the ownership of capital in
11Data are from Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/
portal/statistics/search_database. The market integration index is the average of
inward and outward FDI ows divided by gross domestic product (GDP). The index mea-
sures the intensity of investment integration within the international economy.
















for Equations (26) and (27).
Equation (33) implies that the sum of the value of assets in Turkey and
the EU must equal the aggregate value of capital. Capital market equilibrium
(Equation 32)) requires that the rates of return on capital are the same in
the two countries.
This new formulation makes a distinction between saving (the variation
in the stock of assets) and investment (the variation in the stock of capital).
Whenever the former exceeds the latter, domestic households own capital
in the foreign country, and vice versa. Accordingly, the right-hand-side of
Equation (24) is no longer constrained to be zero, meaning that countries
can experience unbalanced trade accounts. The equality between interest
rates ensures that agents will exhaust all the arbitrage possibilities. That is,
both the European and the Turkish household will use savings to build new
capital in the EU (Turkey) whenever r > r (r < r).
The simulation exercise is the same as before. We started from the pre-
accession steady state, and we assumed that after accession, half of the TFP
gap between Turkey and Europe is closed, while the Europeans start to pay
the transfer. The blue lines in Figures 1 to 4 display the simulation results.
The behavior of the model with capital mobility diers from the no-
capital-mobility case. The increase in European consumption is now short
lived. As Turkish productivity gains momentum, there is a reversal of the
pattern of the terms of trade. The European household starts to invest in
Turkey, which implies a shift from a trade decit to a trade surplus. The
reversal in the terms of trade comes from the no-arbitrage condition in Equa-
tion (32). When the growth of TFP starts to reduce, the return on capital
in Turkey in terms of the Turkish good (r=p), (i.e. the physical marginal
productivity of capital in Turkey), starts to diminish. This implies that the
price of the Turkish good must increase so as to equalize the rates of return
between Turkey and the EU in terms of the European good. Consumption
and investment in Turkey both increase appreciably. Such an increase, cou-
pled with the progressive reversal of the terms of trade depreciation implies
a widening trade decit for Turkey.
The real-wage reaction in Turkey is much stronger than in the previous
exercise, as the appreciable increase in the capital-to-labour ratio is no longer
15counterbalanced by a decrease in the terms of trade anymore. Real wages in
Europe have minor oscillations, converging towards a slightly lower steady
state. Finally, capital mobility facilitates a stronger catch up by Turkey on
Europe, as witnessed by the decreasing pattern of the transfer after the initial
post-accession jump.
The general equilibrium eects considered so far imply that the pattern of
the instantaneous utility of the European household is again non-monotone,
and as a whole it is less aected than in the case of no capital mobility. Still,
by computing Equation (31), we obtained u > 0, thereby conrming our
previous results that, conditional on the assumptions we have made so far,
the Europeans would be better o if Turkey entered the European Union.
Finally in the case of capital mobility, the required TFP increase in Turkey
to make the Europeans indierent towards the accession of Turkey to the
European Union is much bigger than in the previous case. It turns out that
u = 0 if the Turkish TFP goes from 62.5% to 79.45% of European TFP,
meaning a 45% closure of the TFP gap.12
4 The TFP-convergence hypothesis
Throughout this paper, we have made two fundamental assumptions: rst,
Turkish accession to the European Union will improve Turkish institutions,
and second, this institutional improvement can be proxied by relative TFP
growth in Turkey. In this section we shall discuss these two hypotheses.
The rst hypothesis, namely that Turkish institutions will improve in
the bid for the EU membership is hardly controversial. Candidate countries
have to comply with precise formal requirements to join the European Union.
More specically, these requirements include the implementation of the so-
called `Copenhagen criteria' and a minimum level of compliance with the EU
law, i.e. the `Community Acquis'. The Copenhagen criteria set down the
requirements about the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, the respect of human rights and the existence of a functioning
market economy that member countries must meet before accession. Com-
pliance with the Community Acquis means the harmonization of Turkey's
12In an exercise not shown in the text, we considered a model where agents anticipate
the future accession of Turkey to the European Union in 15 years. The results show little
qualitative change. The only signicant change is a quantitative one. The TFP increase in
Turkey necessary to make the Europeans indierent between accession and no-accession
in the case of no capital mobility, becomes 32.8% of the initial TFP gap. This compare
to 31%, the value found in the benchmark case without expectations. No such change is
observed when expectations are introduced into the model with perfect capital mobility.
16laws with those of the European Union. It is veried in progressive negoti-
ations over 35 `chapters', including intellectual property and company law,
institutions, environment, education and culture.
In the process of meeting these criteria on its way towards EU mem-
bership, Turkey has already gone through major institutional changes, and
many more are expected to come. Central to the idea of this paper is that
this conditional process will nally lead to an overall improvement of Turkish
institutions.
The fact that better institutions foster economic growth is also com-
monly accepted. There exists a widespread literature that emphasises the
role played by institutional features such as property rights and the rule
of law in enhancing economic performance (Acemoglu and Johnson (2005),
North (1990), among others).
The link between such institutional developments and the growth of TFP
is less evident, although, we shall argue, no less compelling. It is common
wisdom among growth theorists that cross-country dierences in TFP are of
primary importance in accounting for cross-country income disparities (Hall
and Jones (1999), Klenow and Rodr guez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998)).
This growth-accounting result, coupled with the notion that better institu-
tions foster economic growth, leads to the conclusion that one way in which
the quality of institutions stimulates economic growth must be through its
eect on TFP. A number of empirical studies have already documented the
existence of a positive link between institutions and TFP growth. For in-
stance, using the economic freedom index as an indicator of institutional
quality, Dawson (1998), Ayal and Karras (1998) and Klein and Luu (2003)
nd that economic freedom aects economic growth through its direct ef-
fect on TFP. Similarly, Moomaw and Yang (2006) nd in a sample of 12
OECD countries, 8 of which are EU members, that increases in economic
freedom since 1975 are positively correlated with TFP convergence. On the
basis of these results, they conclude that analogous improvements in the eco-
nomic freedom of recent EU members might boost their productivity growth,
thereby reinforcing their convergence process. A recent analysis by Manca
(2010) conrms these results and shows that countries endowed with better
institutions have higher TFP growth rates, resulting in a faster catch-up with
the industrial leader (the United States).
If the arguments above provide a solid theoretical ground for the TFP-
convergence hypothesis adopted in this paper, the historical evidence con-
cerning TFP convergence among old and new EU members is more mixed.
Kutan and Yigit (2007) nd that, between 1980 and 2004, ve new mem-
bers of the EU-15 (Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden) experi-
enced stronger TFP growth than France, which is taken as representative of
17the original EU countries. They conclude that the integration into the EU
stimulates productivity (TFP) and growth.
Crespo Cuaresma, Ritzberger-Gr unwald, and Silgoner (2008) also ar-
gue that EU membership has a convergence-stimulating eect on long-run
growth. They show that the poorer the country joining the EU, the stronger
the eect is. Similar conclusions are reached by Parente and Prescott (2006).
Comparing the labour productivity performance of the original members of
the EU with that of Western European countries that either acceded to the
Union in 1995 or have not yet acceded, they conclude that EU membership
fosters labour productivity growth. In particular, non-member countries in
1993 were only 81 percent as productive as the original EU countries, al-
though they were 106 percent as productive in 1957.
These positive results are, however, far from conclusive. Salinas-Jimenez,
Alvarez-Ayuso, and Delgado-Rodr guez (2006) nd that the TFP contribu-
tion to labour productivity was negative for new members of the EU-15,
during the 1980-1997 period. Delgado-Rodr guez and Alvarez-Ayuso (2008)
nd similar results for ve dierent periods between 1980 and 2002. Both
studies point out that most of the observed labour productivity convergence
was driven by capital deepening, not TFP increase. Fare, Grosskopf, and
Margaritis (2006) nd evidence for labour productivity convergence within
three dierent groups of EU countries, rather than convergence among all
EU members. Moreover, they argue that the contribution of TFP to produc-
tivity growth diers from country to country, although it is negative in most
places.
In short, our TFP-catching up hypothesis is not an unreasonable theo-
retical assumption, although it lacks denitive empirical support. It should
therefore be taken for what it is: a simplifying assumption that condenses
complex institutional dynamics into the variation in one parameter.
5 Conclusions
The accession of Turkey to the European Union is currently much debated
in Europe. If the core of the debate is about political, historical and cul-
tural issues, the main economic objection to Turkey's possible membership
concerns transfers. As a new member State considerably poorer than the av-
erage EU country, Turkey would end up being a net recipient of the European
structural and cohesion funds.
In this paper, we have used a two-country DGE framework to show that
the negative welfare eect for Europeans induced by the transfers might be
balanced, and even outweighed, by a positive general equilibrium eect, op-
18erating through an external TFP-driven improvement of the EU terms of
trade, vis- a-vis Turkey. The results of the simulations show that Turkey's
accession to the European Union is welfare enhancing for Europeans, pro-
vided that Turkish total factor productivity (TFP) increases suciently after
enlargement. In the model with no capital mobility, the Europeans are better
o if the Turkish TFP increase bridges more than 31% of the initial TFP gap
between Turkey and the European Union. That gure becomes 45% when
capital mobility is introduced.
Our analysis rests on the hypothesis that EU membership produces better
institutions, e.g. institutions that are more favourable to growth. We have
modelled this view by assuming an exogenous increasing pattern for Turkish
total factor productivity after accession. While the better-institutions hy-
pothesis is crucial to our result, we do not attach much importance to the
specic way in which we have modelled it. More realistic models could be de-
vised to make the point, for instance by adding government, and modelling
the institutional improvement as a decrease in the deadweight loss due to
government ineciencies. We leave the task of enriching the institutional set
up presented here to future research.
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Figure 1: Simulation with half TFP-gap catch-up: the results of models with
immobile factors and with capital mobility

































































Figure 2: Simulation with half TFP-gap catch-up: the results of models with
immobile factors and with capital mobility































































Figure 3: Simulation with half TFP-gap catch-up: the results of models with
immobile factors and with capital mobility
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Figure 4: Simulation with half TFP-gap catch-up: the results of models with
immobile factors and with capital mobility
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